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In theoretical literature, the eﬀects of employment protection on unemploy-
ment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation
as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained
individually between workers and ﬁrms. Using a conventional matching
model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment
protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I ﬁnd
that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even
increase the probability of dismissal.
Keywords: employment protection, search and matching models, unemploy-
ment, unions.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: J41, J64, J65, J68.Non-technical summary
Recently, employment protection has again become subject of intense political
debate in Europe as the need for more ﬂexible labor markets to reduce unem-
ployment is discussed. For example, at the beginning of 2006, the French gov-
ernment passed the Contrat Premi` ere Embauche (CPE), implying that young
workers could be ﬁred without any prior notiﬁcation or justiﬁcation, which
was not adopted in the face of massive public opposition. In Germany and
other European countries, too, there has been an ongoing debate on the role
that employment protection plays in reducing unemployment.
In the economic literature, a clear link between employment protection
and unemployment has not yet been established. From a theoretical point
of view, stricter employment protection indeed reduces the incentive for job
creation. However, it produces fewer dismissals, too. Hence, the eﬀects on
unemployment are ambiguous. Reviewing conventional theoretical ﬁndings, it
becomes obvious that the results have been achieved using models in which
wages are either exogenously given or individually bargained between ﬁrms and
workers. This may be problematic as European labor markets are characterized
by a high degree of collective bargaining.
This paper develops a theoretical model that is able to account for this
institutional factor. The basic idea in this context is that a monopoly union
sets a perfectly egalitarian wage for each worker. The union maximizes the gain
from employment compared with unemployment. An increase in restrictions
on redundancies and dismissals improves the union’s bargaining position. This
causes the union to increase its wage claim. It can be shown that the additional
labor costs may outweigh the additional dismissal costs and, hence, result in
an increased probability of dismissal. As stricter employment protection still
lowers the incentive for job creation, unemployment unambiguously rises.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In neuerer Zeit wird die Diskussion ¨ uber K¨ undigungsschutz innerhalb Eu-
ropas im Rahmen der Notwendigkeit ﬂexiblerer Arbeitsm¨ arkte wieder verst¨ arkt
gef¨ uhrt. Anfang des Jahres 2006 hat beispielsweise Frankreichs Regierung
zun¨ achst den Contrat Premi` ere Embauche (CPE) beschlossen, wodurch
j¨ ungere Arbeitnehmer ohne Fristen und Angaben von Gr¨ unden entlassen wer-
den k¨ onnen, der aber aufgrund starker ¨ oﬀentlicher Opposition nicht eingef¨ uhrt
worden ist. Auch in Deutschland, wie in anderen europ¨ aischen L¨ andern, wird
die Rolle des K¨ undigungsschutzes im Zusammenhang mit dem Abbau der Ar-
beitslosigkeit immer wieder diskutiert.
In der ¨ okonomischen Literatur hat man bisher keinen klaren Zusammen-
hang zwischen K¨ undigungsschutz und Arbeitslosigkeit gefunden. Aus theo-
retischer Sicht senkt K¨ undigungsschutz tats¨ achlich den Anreiz zur Schaﬀung
neuer Stellen. Andererseits f¨ uhrt er auch zu weniger Entlassungen. Die zusam-
mengefassten Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitslosigkeit sind demnach unklar.
Bei n¨ aherer Betrachtung der theoretischen Modelle, in denen diese Ergeb-
nisse erzielt wurden, wird jedoch ersichtlich, dass dort entweder von exogen
gegebenen L¨ ohnen oder individuellen Lohnverhandlungen zwischen Arbeitge-
ber und Arbeitnehmer ausgegangen wird. Dies ist problematisch, da viele
europ¨ aische Arbeitsm¨ arkte durch einen hohen Grad an kollektiven Lohnver-
handlungen gekennzeichnet sind.
In diesem Papier wird ein theoretisches Modell entwickelt, dass dieser insti-
tutionellen Gegebenheit besser Rechnung tr¨ agt. Die Grundidee in diesem Mod-
ellrahmen ist, dass es eine Monopolgewerkschaft gibt, die f¨ ur alle g¨ ultige L¨ ohne
setzt. Die Gewerkschaft maximiert den Nutzengewinn von Besch¨ aftigung
im Vergleich zu Arbeitslosigkeit. In diesem Modellrahmen kann gezeigt
werden, dass sich durch einen erh¨ ohten K¨ undigungsschutz die Verhand-
lungsposition der Gewerkschaft verbessert. Dadurch setzt sie h¨ ohere L¨ ohne
durch. Diese durch grossz¨ ugigeren K¨ undigungsschutz induzierte Arbeits-
kostensteigerung kann die zus¨ atzlich erwarteten K¨ undigungskosten kompen-
sieren, so dass die gesamtwirtschaftliche Entlassungswahrscheinlichkeit trotz
erh¨ ohtem K¨ undigungsschutz steigt. Da zus¨ atzlich der Anreiz zur Schaﬀung
neuer Stellen sinkt, hat dann eine Ausweitung des K¨ undigungsschutzes einen
Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit zur Folge.Contents
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1 Introduction
Recently, employment protection has again become subject of intense political
debate in Europe as the need for more ﬂexible labor markets to reduce un-
employment is discussed. For example, at the beginning of 2006, the French
government has presented the Contrat Premi` ere Embauche (CPE), implying
that young workers (below the age of 26) could be ﬁred without any prior no-
tiﬁcation or justiﬁcation (in ﬁrms employing more than 20 workers). The CPE
was not adopted in the face of massive social opposition. In Germany and other
(at least central) European countries, too, there has been a steady steady call
to relax employment protection to encourage employers to hire more workers
on the grounds that employers consider the cost of a future dismissal when
deciding whether to hire a new worker (German Council of Economic Experts,
2003 and 2006). Government oﬃcials claim that the high level of employment
protection is at the root of Europe’s relatively high unemployment rates and
insist that the desired relaxation would reduce unemployment.
In economic literature, a clear link between employment protection and
unemployment has not yet been established. From a theoretical point of view,
higher employment protection reduces the incentive for job creation and for
job destruction as dismissals become more expensive, leading to ambiguous
eﬀects on unemployment (see, for example, Bertola, 1990, Garibaldi, 1998, or
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Thus, theoretically, it is arguable that less
employment protection would indeed decrease unemployment. Reviewing con-
ventional theoretical ﬁndings, it becomes obvious that the results have been
achieved using models in which wages are either exogenously given or indi-
1Author: Nikolai St¨ ahler, Deutsche Bundesbank, Department of Economics, Wilhelm-
Epstein-Str. 14, 60431 Framkfurt am Main, e-mail: nikolai.staehler@bundesbank.de. I
would like to thank Florian Baumann, Laszlo Goerke, Rolf Helmes, Johannes Hoﬀmann,
Marcus Jansen, Martin Kolmar and Beate Schirwitz for discussions on the topic. I am
grateful for comments received from participants of the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Pub-
lic Choice Society and the 2006 Congress of the International Institute for Public Finance.
The idea for this paper was born while I was working as part of the research group Het-
erogeneous Labor: Positive and Normative Aspects of the Skill Structure of Labor founded
by the German Research Association (DFG). Financial support is gratefully acknowledged.
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions of the Deutsche
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1vidually bargained between ﬁrms and workers. However, (continental) Euro-
pean labor markets are characterized by a high degree of collective bargaining
power through unionization (OECD, 2004). I therefore present a matching
model basically in line with that of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999),
with unionized wage bargaining. It is shown that employment protection may
indeed be responsible for high unemployment in the presence of collective bar-
gaining. Under certain circumstances, an increase in employment protection
even increases dismissals in this model. This counterintuitive result is barely
mentioned in literature. As will be shown, it is the consequence of the trade
union’s wage setting behavior to maximize the gain from employment.2
The combination of employment protection and unionized wage bargain-
ing has barely entered the theoretical economic arena due to problems made
clear in the model by Booth (1995a). In traditional literature, it has basically
been assumed that ﬁrms employ a certain stock of workers and have to dis-
miss some these workers in the event of an economic shock. It seems logical
that, when introducing ﬁring costs (making any dismissal costly), the initial
stock of workers employed as well as the number of workers dismissed decrease.
Booth (1995a) and Belot and van Ours (2004) show that overall employment
decreases. A more sophisticated analysis is presented by Modesto and Thomas
(2001) who integrate a inﬁnite horizon, or by Modesto (2004) who uses an over-
lapping generation model. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) have shown a way
to combine the matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with
unionized wage bargaining. The basic idea is that the union is organized as a
democracy that sets a perfectly egalitarian wage for each member. Outsiders
and unemployed workers are excluded from membership. Insider workers are
heterogenous in their idiosyncratic productivity and may have diﬀerent pref-
erences concerning the wage set by the union. The union therefore chooses the
wage for all matches by majority voting. In the event that the job value turns
negative (as a result of to the chosen wage), ﬁrms are free to destroy the job.
This set-up corresponds to the classical monopoly union approach, in which
unions impose their preferred wage level on the ﬁrm which then determines
2To my knowledge, the only analysis that ﬁnds a positive relation between employment
protection and dismissals is by Cavalcanti (2004). He presents a model in which employment
protection increases with job tenure. Then, a rise in employment protection may result in
more dismissals as ﬁrms wish to compensate for the continuously increasing costs by ’early’
dismissals. The eﬀects in the present analysis are diﬀerent, however, and totally driven by
the wage setting behavior.
2employment (see McDonald and Solow, 1981). Garibaldi and Violante (2005)
enhance this setting by allowing for a utilitarian union that takes into account
the fact that higher wages impose higher insider reservation productivity and,
thus, job destruction (which reﬂects the fact that the union also - at least to
a certain extent - considers the level of employment of insiders). Garibaldi
and Violante (2005) analyze the eﬀects of severance payments in such a frame-
work. They conﬁrm the famous employment neutrality result of severance
payments by Lazear (1990) provided that outsiders remain unconstrained by
their individual-level bargaining because then the change in severance pay-
ments is fully absorbed by a corresponding change in wages. However, they
show that when insiders and outsiders are constrained by the wage set by
the union, severance payments unambiguously decrease overall employment.
Garibaldi and Violante (2005) assume, in line with Saint-Paul (2002), that the
utility of unemployment is given from the union’s point of view.
In this paper, I present a model in the manner of Garibaldi and Violante
(2005); in contrast to their model, the utility of unemployment is directly con-
sidered by the union. The union maximizes the gain from employment (i.e. the
utility diﬀerence between being employed and being unemployed). It sets the
optimal wage by equalizing the marginal gain from a wage increase with the
marginal loss due to higher job reallocation (resulting from higher dismissal
probability and lower re-employment chances given higher labor costs). An
increase in dismissal restrictions ceteris paribus reduces job reallocation and
increases the marginal eﬀects of wage changes on the corresponding change
in job reallocation. This ceteris paribus decreases the union’s utility which
is anticipated by the union and causes the wage claim to increase with aug-
mented employment protection in order to compensate for the loss. It can
be shown that, for a uniform productivity distribution, the additional labor
costs outweigh the additional dismissal costs and, hence, result in an increased
dismissal probability. (Note that for a more general distribution function,
this eﬀect is still present, but may be oﬀset by opposing wage eﬀects then
existent.) As higher employment protection still lowers the incentive for job
creation, unemployment unambiguously increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and derives the equilibrium conditions with unionized wage bargaining. Sec-
tion 3 contains the comparative static analysis. Conclusions are presented in
section 4. A mathematical appendix has been included.
32 The Model
The model presented here builds on that of Garibaldi and Violante (2005).
The matching framework therefore diﬀers slightly from the classical matching
model in the manner of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) while, nevertheless,
retaining the same features. This issue has been widely discussed by Garibaldi
and Violante (2005, pp. 807-808) and will therefore not be repeated here.
I consider an economy in continuous time, where the population is normal-
ized to one and there is a ’large’ supply of potential ﬁrms (or jobs, respectively).
Agents discount at rate r. The labor market is characterized by search fric-
tions. There is a ﬁxed measure v of matching licences that can be rented
by ﬁrms each period at costs q. Potential ﬁrms compete for the matching
licences, while free market entry ensures that the steady state value of a va-
cancy will be zero. Vacant jobs and unemployed workers, u, meet randomly,
where α>0 is the ﬁxed contact rate for an unemployed worker. There is no
on-the-job search. This implies that the contact rate for a vacant job can be
expressed as (αu)/v. Upon meeting, the initial productivity level of the job, x,
is drawn from a cumulative distribution function G(x), where g(x) denotes the
corresponding density function. For simplicity and without loss of generality,
I assume that x ∈ [0,1]. Only after the parties meet is the realization of the
idiosyncratic productivity component x revealed. This implies that a contact
might not necessarily yield job creation. Only if the idiosyncratic productivity
component exceeds some endogenously determined threshold value, Ro,i sa
job created. After a successful match, ﬁrms move on to production and release
the costly matching licence, which is immediately rented out to another vacant
ﬁrm.
After the successful match, the worker starts production with productivity
x initially drawn upon meeting. However, there are idiosyncratic productivity
shocks that hit a ﬁrm-worker pair at a Poisson rate λ>0. In the event
of a shock, a new idiosyncratic productivity is drawn from the distribution
function G(x). When productivity falls below an endogenously determined
threshold value, Ri, the job is destroyed and ﬁrms have to pay a dismissal
tax, T. This occurs with probability λG(Ri). Note that Ro is the threshold
value for newly created jobs (outsider reservation productivity), whereas Ri
denotes the one for existing jobs (insider reservation productivity). Outsider
reservation productivity determines job creation in steady state and can be
4interpreted as being equivalent to market tightness found in matching models
in the manner of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The larger the outsider
reservation productivity is, the lower job creation is as a newly created job
needs a rather high productivity (which corresponds to a low market tightness
in the ’classical’ matching setup).
A monopoly union sets a wage, ω, which is binding for all workers in
the economy. In literature, several diﬀerent union utility functions have been
discussed. Trade unions can be utilitarian, maximizing the sum of their mem-
bers’ utility (either employed or unemployed). Or the union is considered to
be insider-dominated, i.e. it maximizes the gain of its members from employ-
ment over unemployment (or any other alternative income). The extent to
which unions pursue which objectives remains an open empirical question (see
Goerke et al., 2007, Booth, 1995b, Pencavel, 1991, and Oswald 1982, 1993).
I assume, partly following Goerke et al. (2007), that the union maximizes
the gain from employment over unemployment, i.e. the diﬀerence between the
utility of employment and unemployment. It therefore takes into account the
eﬀects of its wage setting on both these utilities.3
The value of a vacant ﬁrm, V , can be expressed by the following well-known
Bellman equation
rV = −q +
αu
v
   1
Ro
J(x)dG(x) − [1 − G(Ro)]V
 
, (1)
where J(x) captures the value of a (newly) created job which can be stated as
(r + λ)J(x)=x − ω + λ
  1
Ri
Ji(x)dG(x) − λG(Ri)T. (2)
Analogously, the utility ﬂow of an employed worker can be expressed by the
Bellman equation




3It should be noted that assuming this kind of utility function allows us to obtain fairly
clear analytical results, whereas a utilitarian utility function, for example, does not. This
problem is common in literature incorporating unions. A common way to avoid this problem
is to assume that the utility of unemployment is constant (see, for example, Garibaldi and
Violante, 2005 or Saint-Paul, 2002). As it is reasonable to assume that the union’s wage
setting behavior does indeed aﬀect the utility of unemployment, we chose the union utility
function described above. It should be borne in mind, however, that the unambiguous results
derived below might not hold for alternative utility functions.
5where the utility of an unemployed worker, U, can be written as
rU = α
   1
Ro
WdG(x) − [1 − G(Ro)]U
 
. (4)
For simplicity, we exclude any leisure or unemployment income. Hence, the
unemployed worker only receives utility from the probability of ﬁnding a new
job multiplied by the corresponding utility diﬀerence of being employed and
staying unemployed.
To calculate the ﬁrm’s job creation and job destruction conditions, we have
to consider that a ﬁrm will dismiss a worker if the value of an existing job falls
short of the negative dismissal tax, i.e. J(Ri)=−T. For job creation, the value
of a newly created job must at least be equal to zero, J(Ro) = 0. The latter
holds true as free market entry guarantees V = 0 due to the price alignment
for matching licences. Assuming these conditions and following Garibaldi and






(x − Ri)dG(x)=ω − rT, (5)






(x − Ri)dG(x)=ω + λT, (6)
as the ﬁrm-level job creation conditions for any given wage ω. These two
equations endogenously determine the equilibrium values for insider reserva-
tion productivity, Ri, and outsider reservation productivity, Ro.
The union’s utility function can be expressed as





r + λG(Ri)+α[1 − G(Ro)]
, (7)
which can be achieved by substituting equation (4) into equation (3) and some
rearranging. Maximizing equation (7) with respect to the wage, ω, subject to
equations (5) and (6), - the ﬁrms’ reaction to a change in wages, as the union
considers the eﬀect of their wage setting on job creation and job destruction
-, yields
1
[r + λG(Ri)+α[1 − G(Ro)]]
=
ω










where the lhs represent the marginal gain due to an increase in the wage, ω,
whereas the rhs is the corresponding utility loss. The latter is represented




dω (i.e. an increased dismissal probability





wage is chosen so that the marginal utility gain equals the marginal utility
loss. Rearranging allows us to restate this equation as









      
=dJR/dω
. (9)




r+λG(Ri) > 0 (obtained from equations (5)
and (6)), it is straightforward to show that
ω =
[r + λG(Ri)][r + λG(Ri)+α[1 − G(Ro)]]
(r + λ)[λg(Ri) − αg(Ro)]
. (10)
Equation (10) states that each worker obtains the reservation wage per period
(which is zero in our model as there is no leisure or unemployment income) plus
an extra remuneration for working, equal to ω. For tractability and analytical
convenience, we assume a uniform productivity distribution for x ∈ [0,1]. This
yields G(x)=x, g(x)=1a n d
  1
Rk(x − Rk)dG(x)=1
2(1 − Rk)2,w i t hk = i,o.
Equation (10) can be re-written as
ω
∗ =
[r + λRi][r + λRi + α(1 − Ro)]
(r + λ)(λ − α)
. (11)
Further implications of the uniform distribution function are discussed in Ap-
pendix B. Equation (11) shows that for λ>α(which will be discussed in
more detail below but is assumed to hold henceforth) the wage ceteris paribus
increases with increasing dismissal probability, pictured by an increase in Ri,
to compensate for the risk of losing the job, while it ceteris paribus decreases
with decreasing re-employment chances, described by an increase in Ro, as the
chances of ﬁnding another job become less likely when unemployed.
Substituting the wage, equation (11), into the ﬁrm-level job destruction
and job creation conditions, equations (5) and (6), and taking into account
4Note that dismissal probability is given by λG(Ri), whereas (re-)employment chances
are given by α[1−G(Ro)] in equilibrium. Hence, the JR is given by λG(Ri)+α[1−G(Ro)], i.e.
rate of employed workers becoming unemployed plus the rate of unemployed workers ﬁnding
employment. Changing the wage claim, ω, changes the dismissal and (re-)employment
probability and, hence, the JR.
7the uniform distribution function, the market equilibrium conditions for job








[r + λRi][r + λRi + α(1 − Ro)]
(r + λ)(λ − α)
− rT, (12)








[r + λRi][r + λRi + α(1 − Ro)]
(r + λ)(λ − α)
+ λT, (13)
as equilibrium job creation (hereinafter JC). Simultaneously solving equations
(12) and (13) for insider and outsider reservation productivity, Ri and Ro,
respectively, determines equilibrium.
Note that the possibility of an unstable equilibrium exists. While the JC
has a positive slope in the (Ri/Ro)-space, the JD is also positively sloped as
s h o w ni nﬁ g u r e1 . 5 The interpretation of the JC is simple. For a pair (Ri,R o)
on the JC curve, where J(Ro) = 0, a marginal increase in insider reservation
productivity, Ri, reduces the expected gains from a new realization of the
idiosyncratic shock which occurs at rate λ and makes the outsider job value
negative. To remain on the curve it is necessary to increase outsider reservation
productivity, Ro, in order to compensate for this expected loss. The rise in
Ro has a direct impact on the marginal (newly created) job’s productivity as
well as an indirect impact through a reduction in the wage via a decline in the
worker’s outside option rU.
The positive slope of the JD is due to the positive feedback between the
wage, ω, and insider reservation productivity, Ri. For a pair (Ri,R o)o nt h e
JD curve, where J(Ri)=−T, a decrease in Ro (yielding better re-employment
chances) increases the wage through its positive eﬀect on the worker’s outside
option rU and reduces the value of the marginal job. To restore the JD, it is
necessary to augment the value of the job for the ﬁrm, which ceteris paribus
is done by increasing Ri. This, however, generates a rise in the union wage
(equation (11)) which overcompensates for the increase in the value of the job
for the ﬁrm. Thus, due to the unionized wage setting, Ri must be decreased
in order to restore the JD which explains the positive slope.
Proposition 1. There exists a stable equilibrium for λ>α .
Proof. Concerning stability, we know that if the Jacobi-matrix of the system
of equations (12) and (13) is negative the resulting equilibrium is stable. The
5Figure 1 represents equations (12) and (13) for r =0 .05, λ =0 .6, α =0 .2a n dT =0 .
8Jacobi-matrix can be derived as (see Appendix A)
D =
−λ(r + λRi) − λα(1 − Ro)
(r + λ)(λ − α)
, (14)














Figure 1: Equilibrium with Unionized Wage Bargaining
We further concentrate on the unique and stable equilibrium and, thus,
assume λ>αto hold henceforth. This guarantees that the JC’s slope exceeds
the JD’s. For λ<α , an equilibrium may exist, but then, the JD’s slope is
steeper than the JC’s. It is straightforward to show that such an equilibrium is
explosive as there will be no adjustment to the equilibrium point A in ﬁgure 1
after an exogenous shock. Furthermore, for λ<α , the union wage and union’s
utility would be negative.
Unemployment is determined by inﬂows into unemployment, [(1 −
u)λG(Ri)], and outﬂows out of unemployment, [u[1 − G(Ro)]α], according
to job destruction and job creation conditions (and, hence, the correspond-
ing reservation productivity) in equilibrium. In steady state, the changes in






λRi + α[1 − Ro]
. (15)
3 Comparative Statics
In what follows, we further develop the eﬀects that occur when employment
protection is increased. We restrict our attention to the steady state. To-

























−λ(r + λRi) − λα(1 − Ro)
(r + λ)(λ − α)
< 0, (18)
for λ>α . Equations (16) and (17) state that both insider and outsider reser-
vation productivity increase with increasing dismissal costs. This implies more
job destruction and less job creation in equilibrium, unambiguously increasing
unemployment (see equation (15)). This certainly needs some further explana-
tion, as the rise in dismissals - even though they become costlier - is certainly
surprising at ﬁrst glance. We will, however, start by analyzing the intuitive
eﬀect (the decline in job creation) and then turn to the counterintuitive eﬀect.
From diﬀerentiating the JC, equation (13), we obtain
−
λ[(λ − α)+2 r +( λ + α)Ri + α(1 − Ro)]






(r + λ)(λ − α)
 
dRo = λdT. (19)
Equation (19) states that ceteris paribus job creation decreases (which im-
plies an increase in outsider reservation productivity, Ro) with increasing ﬁring
costs, T, and insider reservation productivity, Ri. The reasoning is straight-
forward and, therefore, quickly explained. Higher dismissal costs increase ex-
pected total labor costs and, thus, make job creation less attractive. The same
holds for higher insider reservation productivity due to the wage eﬀect. Ad-
ditionally, the probability of a job closure increases and, hence, the expected
duration and value of a newly created job decrease (see also Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999).
Diﬀerentiating the JD, equation (12), yields
−
(λ + α)(r + λRi)+λα(1 − Ro)
(r + λ)(λ − α)
dRi +
α(r + λRi)
(r + λ)(λ − α)
dRo = −rdT. (20)
According to equation (20), job destruction (insider reservation productivity,
Ri) increases with decreasing job creation (a rise in outsider reservation pro-
ductivity, Ro). The explanation can be retraced in the equilibrium description
in section 2. However, the interesting fact is that ceteris paribus job destruc-
tion increases when ﬁring costs, T, are augmented. This is quite surprising and
contradicts the ﬁndings of most convectional models. Higher dismissal costs
(accompanied by the resulting higher outsider reservation productivity) reduce
10the value of the job. To restore the job destruction condition, J(Ri)=−T,
the ﬁrm must reduce the marginal job value. Disregarding the wage eﬀect
for the moment (and relating our model to conventional ﬁndings), we see in
equation (5) that this can be done by reducing insider reservation produc-
tivity and, thus, dismissals decrease according to
(r+λRi)
r+λ > 0. Nevertheless,
the wage eﬀect is present in our setup. The reduction of Ri implies a wage






r+λ > 0 (see equations (5) and (11)). In total, this
implies an increase in the value of a job, not complying with the JD. Hence,
insider reservation productivity must be increased in order to restore the job
destruction condition.
Combining these eﬀects (an increase in insider and outsider reservation
productivity) explains equations (16) and (17). Graphically, this is represented
by an upward shift of the JD curve and a downward shift of the JC curve in
ﬁgure 1.
To get a better understanding of the eﬀects at work, reconsider the struc-
ture of our model and the union’s behavior. We know that dismissal costs are
exogenously given by some third party (the government) not explicitly mod-
elled. Given the wage, ω, ﬁrms determine job creation and job destruction (or
speaking in terms of the model, Ro and Ri) according to equations (5) and (6).
However, the wage is set by the union before insider and outsider reservation
productivity are chosen by the ﬁrm. Choosing the optimal wage, the union
takes into consideration the ﬁrms’ choice of Ri and Ro (given the dismissal
taxes, T) and the ﬁrms’ reaction to the wage claim. The union is therefore
able to implicitly determine dismissal probability and (re-)employment prob-
ability (equations (12) and (13)). It does so by maximizing the diﬀerence
between the utilities of being employed and being unemployed (equation (7)).
Disregarding the wage eﬀect for the moment (i.e. assuming that the union
did not set the wage before ﬁrms determine employment), ceteris paribus
an increase of dismissal costs, T, decreases dismissal probability and re-
employment chances. This becomes quite apparent by totally diﬀerentiating





r+λRi < 0a n ddRo
dT =
(r+λ)λRi
r+λRi > 0. This decreases the JR
and, thus, increases the rise of the JR resulting from an increased wage claim,
(λ−α) r+λ
r+λRi (see also the brief description in footnote 4), which ceteris paribus
reduces the union’s wage claim according to equation (11) as a consequence of
11reduced marginal utility gain and increased marginal utility loss due to a wage
increase (see equation (9)). Thus, the union’s utility falls.6 The loss of utility
is, however, anticipated by the union. In order to compensate for the utility
loss, the union’s wage claim increases (over-)proportionably when dismissal
costs are raised by forcing the ﬁrms to increase dismissal probability accord-
ing to the JD (see equation (20)). Note, however, that this relatively strong
wage eﬀect unambiguously holds true for a uniform distribution function. Due
to additional eﬀects resulting from a more general distribution function, the
wage eﬀect and, hence, employment eﬀects may become ambiguous (see also
Appendix B).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented a matching model in the manner of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) with unionized wage bargaining following an enhanced
approach by Garibaldi and Violante (2005). I have shown that, for a uniform
distribution function, an increase in employment protection unambiguously
increases unemployment due to less job creation and, in contrast to most con-
ventional ﬁndings, results in even higher job destruction.
As higher employment protection increases expected dismissal costs, it is
quite intuitive (and in line with conventional ﬁndings) that job creation de-
creases. The potential rise in dismissal probability needs some further ex-
planation, however. I have assumed an insider-dominated monopoly union
that maximizes the gain from employment over unemployment. It takes into
account the eﬀects which its wage claim, binding for all ﬁrms, has on job cre-
ation and destruction and, thus, on job reallocation. Disregarding the wage
eﬀect, higher employment protection decreases dismissal probability and (re-)
employment chances and, thus, job reallocation as presented in conventional
literature. But higher employment protection also implies that the marginal
increase in the job reallocation rate due to a rise in wages is increased which
would result in a utility loss for the union. As this is anticipated by the union,
it raises its wage claim in order to compensate for this eﬀect. Uncouthly spo-
6Note that substituting the optimally chosen wage, equation (11), into the union’s utility




that union’s utility equals the reciprocal of the change in the JR due to an increase in the
wage claim. Hence, the lower the change in the JR due to a change in the wage claim (which
indeed decreases with increasing employment protection), the higher the union’s utility.
12ken, we could say that an increase of employment protection improves the
union’s bargaining position. The additional labor costs (due to higher wages)
overcompensate for the additional dismissal costs and, thus, increase dismissal
probability. More dismissals and less job creation increase unemployment.
This unambiguously holds true for a uniform productivity distribution. For
a more general distribution function, the wage eﬀect is ambiguous. However,
the eﬀect described is still present and, thus, tends to increase unemployment
when employment protection is generous. Only when this eﬀect is compensated
by the opposing eﬀects resulting from a more general distribution function do
the results of conventional ﬁndings also apply to unionized wage bargaining.
This is an empirical question which undoubtedly warrants further attention.
Mathematical Appendix
A Calculating the Jacobi-matrix and the
Comparative Statics
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (12) and (13) yields equations (20) and (19).































With D = det(B), which gives the Jacobi-matrix, equation (18), rearranging






























After some rearranging, equation (22) produces equations (16) and (17).
13B The Eﬀects with More General Distribution
Functions
As already mentioned, some of the results achieved in the paper are based on
the assumption of a uniform productivity distribution and, hence, the corre-
sponding large wage eﬀect. With a more general distribution function, the
wage eﬀect is diﬀerent. Diﬀerentiating equation (10) with respect to insider




2[r + λG(Ri)] + α[1 − G(Ro)]
(r + λ)[λg(Ri) − αg(Ro)]
− λg
 (Ri)
[r + λG(Ri)][r + λG(Ri)+α[1 − G(Ro)]]






(r + λ)[λg(Ri) − αg(Ro)]
+ αg
 (Ro)
[r + λG(Ri)][r + λG(Ri)+α[1 − G(Ro)]]
[(r + λ)[λg(Ri) − αg(Ro)]]2 . (24)
It is easy to see that the ﬁrst terms on the rhs of equations (23) and (24)
correspond to the changes with a uniform distribution function calculated in
the main text and, thus, yield the same implications. However, there is an
additional wage eﬀect with a more general distribution function. This is cap-
tured by the second terms on the rhs of equations (23) and (24). Whether
these terms are negative or positive depends to a great extent on the proper-
ties of the density function at reservation productivity Ri and Ro, respectively.
If g (Rk) < 0, the results presented in the main text are ampliﬁed. For a
normally distributed productivity, for example, this is the case if Rk >μ ,
where μ is the expected value of productivity. If g (Rk) > 0, however, the
wage increase (decrease, respectively) reached in the main text is lessened by
the second terms on the rhs of equations (23) and (24). If this second eﬀect
dominates the ﬁrst eﬀect, wages decrease with increasing dismissal probabil-
ity and increase with increasing job creation. Then, it is a straightforward
matter to show that an increase in dismissal costs leads to the results found
in conventional literature, i.e. a decrease in job destruction and job creation
and, hence, ambiguous eﬀects on unemployment. If the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
(as is unambiguously the case with a uniform distribution), the results in the
main text can be qualitatively reached even with a more general distribution
function.
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